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es I write this Editor’s Page, Vioxx has just been withdrawn
rom the market by Merck, Inc., because of an increased risk
f cardiovascular (CV) events. Given the number of patients
nvolved (it is estimated that Vioxx was prescribed approx-
mately 10 million times per month in the U.S.), the
agnitude of sales of the agent ($2.5 billion/year), the
nancial impact upon Merck stock (a fall of 27% amounting
o $27 billion), and the serious nature of the side effects
myocardial infarction and stroke), it is not surprising that
his action received major media attention. The withdrawal
rovoked the immediate release of papers in the New
ngland Journal of Medicine by prominent CV authorities
uestioning whether similar action should be taken for all
elective cycloxygenase-2 inhibitors (COXIBs) and even
alling for a Congressional investigation (1,2). Clearly, this
atter has the potential for significant fallout in many areas.
Non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) are
ffective agents, but are limited by potentially serious gas-
rointestinal (GI) ulcerations and bleeding. Vioxx was one
f several COXIBs developed to exploit the anti-
nflammatory effects of selective cyclooxygenase (COX)-2
nhibition while preserving the protective action of COX-1
n the GI mucosa. The VIGOR study (3), which docu-
ented the efficacy of Vioxx in reducing GI side effects, also
ielded unexpected evidence of increased myocardial infarc-
ion and stroke. Although the relationship between the
ncreased CV events observed and Vioxx was uncertain, a
lausible explanation consisted of the unopposed prothrom-
otic effect of thromboxane A2 via the COX-1 pathway.
iven the uncertainty regarding the findings from the
IGOR study, the apparent absence of similar adverse
vents from other studies, and the demonstrated GI benefit,
he major alteration in prescribing recommendations was to
rge that all patients with an indication for aspirin (usually
or prophylaxis of CV disease) be given that agent with
ioxx. Two years after the VIGOR study was published, the
ood and Drug Administration (FDA) instructed Merck to
dd a warning regarding the risk of CV disease to the
ackage insert. Another two years passed until the results of
study of colon polyps documented the CV risk and
esulted in the withdrawal of Vioxx from the market.
At this time the exact magnitude of the problem remains
ncertain. The data that provoked the withdrawal were
erived from a study of 2,600 patients without CV disease
n whom the drug was being tested to prevent the recurrence
f colonic polyps. It was reported that the incidence of CV tvents was approximately double (7 vs. 15 in 1,000 patients
nnually) in patients who received the drug. The incidence
f events in patients with CV disease would be anticipated
o be higher. Obviously, this is a serious problem and these
re figures of public health proportions.
Although it is unclear where, if anywhere, the primary
esponsibility for this chain of events lies, the finger point-
ng is well underway. Merck, of course, receives the most
ttention as a culprit because it developed, tested, and sold
he drug and has a major incentive to generate dividends for
tockholders. The FDA presents a prominent target for
lame because it is charged with the responsibility of
nsuring the safety of pharmaceuticals. Physicians are not
pared culpability and are accused of being too ready to use
ew drugs with potential side effects, rather than older
gents with longer track records. The politically correct
ight claim it is a systems problem, with the proper
rocesses not being in place to enable these entities to do
heir jobs. It is likely that no one particular party is entirely
esponsible, and even likelier that if one is, it will never be
learly identified. However, each of these parties, as well as
atients, will probably experience fallout from the Vioxx
ffair for years to come.
Patients, of course, will be the group most affected. They
ave been exposed to the risk of adverse CV events for some
ime. In addition, they have now lost access to a drug that
as effective therapy for the inflammatory diseases for
hich it was used. Perhaps of greatest consequence, patients
ave again been given reason to worry about the quality and
afety of their health care system. Coming on the heels of
ecent reports of medical errors, we can expect patients to
ncreasingly question the wisdom of our recommendations
nd efficacy of our management.
The pharmaceutical industry will almost certainly feel the
ffects of the Vioxx affair for some time. Just as a plane crash
asts a pall over the entire airline industry, so a major
ithdrawal will dull the luster of prior drug development
ccomplishments. Because the pharmaceutical industry op-
rates on a financial incentive basis, it will be subjected to an
ntense examination of its behavior and motives. New drugs
ill be viewed with more skepticism and likely will be
ubjected to increased testing. I suspect that the marketing
ractices of the pharmaceutical companies will come under
urther scrutiny. Does the industry make new drugs appear
xcessively attractive in direct-to-consumer advertising? Is
here adequate emphasis upon potentially serious side effects
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November 16, 2004:2080–1 Editor’s Pagen marketing to physicians? For my part, the industry action
hat I most regret was the failure to perform a properly
owered, prospective randomized clinical trial (RCT) im-
ediately after the VIGOR study to resolve with certainty
hether COXIBs carried an increased risk of CV events.
ne can assume that pharmaceutical companies will hasten
o perform such definitive studies in the future, even for side
ffects whose relation to the drug seems remote.
As is nearly always the case in drug recalls, the FDA will
lmost certainly be in line for a close examination. It will
ikely be noted that Vioxx was approved before the VIGOR
tudy was published, and that the FDA did not require
erck to perform an RCT to establish the absence of CV
isk. However, at the time the COXIBs were viewed as an
mportant breakthrough in addressing the prevalent and
ostly problem of serious GI side effects of NSAIDs.
oreover, the scrutiny given to new drugs is as great in the
.S. as anywhere in the world, if not greater. The profes-
ionals at the FDA are given the difficult task of establishing
isk versus benefit in as cost-effective and timely a manner as
ossible. Most physicians I know feel our drug approval
rocess is too slow and detailed, not too quick and super-
cial. We often lag behind other countries in new therapies.
can recall a neighbor having to go to Canada to receive a
rug-eluting stent that was not approved in the U.S.
evertheless, the FDA will likely become even more de-
anding in its safety requirements for new drugs, and take
ore drastic action whenever suspicions of serious side
ffects arise for existing agents. Because clear evidence of
ncreased CV risk for Vioxx did not appear until 18 months
f therapy, some will argue for this length of follow-up
efore approving new pharmaceuticals. This, in my opinion,
ould be a detrimental overreaction.
Finally, we as physicians will also be exposed to fallout
rom the Vioxx recall. Many feel that the superiority of
OX-1 inhibitors over other NSAIDs was modest and that
he drugs were overused. Some are already portraying
hysicians as too susceptible to marketing and too quick to
dopt new therapies. Our judgment is being questioned in
egard to the ability to assess the real advantages of one
gent over another and our tendency to overutilize new
rugs in situations for which their advantages are not
pplicable. However, as evidenced by the multiple megatri-ls prevalent in our field, I believe that cardiologists are
ore data driven and evidence based in their practices than
ost physicians. Nevertheless, I would not be surprised if
atients did not check the Internet themselves more often to
ake sure we have not missed something, and if authorities
o not continue to tighten the ground rules under which we
eceive marketing and educational efforts.
In looking back over the Vioxx affair, a number of
mpressions surface. First, things always appear clearer and
ore apparent in retrospect, but we live prospectively. Even
nowing all the data now available, I cannot say that the
ctions taken were totally unreasonable. The uncertain risk
f CV events was being balanced against the documented
enefits for GI complications. Even after the VIGOR study
as published, I continued to prescribe Vioxx to my own
amily. Second, perhaps we as physicians tend to overesti-
ate the benefits and underestimate the risks of new
herapies. If this is so, however, I believe it is primarily to
rovide the greatest benefits to our patients. Third, as stated
efore, I do wish that an RCT for CV risk had been
erformed. In regard to possible pressures to conduct safety
rials for 18 months or longer or to withdraw drugs at the
rst evidence of possible adverse effects, I think these would
e overreactions. Rather, I believe each case should be
andled individually. There will, and probably should, be
allout from the Vioxx affair; of that I have no doubt. I hope
he repercussions will be appropriate in magnitude and
irection, and that we will emerge with a better system, not
ne that is worse.
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